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Abstract
Differential privacy formalises privacy-preserving mechanisms that provide access to a
database. We pose the question of whether Bayesian inference itself can be used directly
to provide private access to data, with no modification. The answer is affirmative: under
certain conditions on the prior, sampling from the posterior distribution can be used to
achieve a desired level of privacy and utility. To do so, we generalise differential privacy
to arbitrary dataset metrics, outcome spaces and distribution families. This allows us to
also deal with non-i.i.d or non-tabular datasets. We prove bounds on the sensitivity of
the posterior to the data, which gives a measure of robustness. We also show how to use
posterior sampling to provide differentially private responses to queries, within a decision-
theoretic framework. Finally, we provide bounds on the utility and on the distinguishability
of datasets. The latter are complemented by a novel use of Le Cam’s method to obtain
lower bounds. All our general results hold for arbitrary database metrics, including those
for the common definition of differential privacy. For specific choices of the metric, we give
a number of examples satisfying our assumptions.
Keywords: Bayesian Inference, Differential Privacy, Robustness, Adversarial Learning
∗. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Algorithmic Learning Theory 2014 (Dimitrakakis et al.,
2014). This version corrects constant factors in the upper bounds and introduces new material on utility
analysis and lower bounds.
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1. Introduction
The Bayesian framework for statistical decision theory incorporates uncertainty into decision
making in a probabilistic manner. This makes it attractive, as predictions and modelling
can all be made with the machinery of probability. More specifically, a Bayesian statistician
begins by assuming that the world is described by a probabilistic model within some family,
and he assigns a prior belief to each one of the models. After observing data, this belief
is adjusted through Bayes’s theorem to the so called posterior belief. This expresses the
statistician’s conclusion given the data and the prior assumptions. The statistician can then
release the posterior to the world, for others to build upon, or use for principled decision
making under uncertainty.
Unfortunately, it is frequently the case that the data acquired by the statistician is
sensitive. Consequently, there is a fear that any information released by the statistician
that depends on the data—be that the posterior distribution itself or any decisions that
follow from the calculated posterior—may reveal sensitive information in the original data.
Recently, the framework of differential privacy has been proposed to codify this leakage
of information. If an algorithm is differentially private, then its output can only leak a
bounded amount of information about its input.
We are interested in the question of how we can build differentially-private algorithms
within the Bayesian framework. More precisely, we examine when the choice of prior is
sufficient to guarantee differential privacy for decisions that are derived from the posterior
distribution. Our work builds a unified understanding of privacy and learning in adver-
sarial environments, under a decision-theoretic framework. We show that under suitable
assumptions, standard Bayesian inference and posterior sampling can achieve uniformly
good utility with a fixed privacy budget in the differential privacy setting. We also indicate
strong connections between robustness and privacy.
In this paper, we show that the Bayesian statistician’s choice of prior distribution ensures
a base level of data privacy through the posterior distribution; the statistician can safely
respond to external queries using samples from the posterior. When estimating a linear
model from sensitive data, for example, samples from the posterior correspond to different
possible fits. The more samples used, the more privacy is leaked, while query responses may
be more accurate. Our proposed approach complements existing mechanisms rather well,
and may be particularly useful in situations where Bayesian inference is already in use. For
this reason, we provide illustrative examples in the exponential family. However, our setting
is wholly general and not limited to specific distribution families, or i.i.d. observations.
Any family could be chosen: so long as it either satisfies our assumptions directly, or can
be restricted so that it does. For example, our framework applies to families of discrete
Bayesian networks with directed-acyclic topologies (e.g., Markov chains; see Lemma 24
on page 20) and multivariate Gaussians (see Lemma 23), where the observations may not
satisfy the i.i.d. assumption.
Summary of setting. A Bayesian statistician (B) wishes to communicate results about
data x to a third party (A ), but without revealing the data x itself. We make no assump-
tions on the data x, which could be a single observation, an i.i.d. sample, or a sequence of
observations. The protocol of interaction between B and A is summarised below.
1. B selects a model family (FΘ) and a prior (ξ).
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2. A is allowed to see FΘ and ξ and is computationally unbounded.
3. B observes data x and calculates the posterior ξ(θ | x) but does not reveal it.
Then, for steps t = 1, 2, . . ., repeat the following:
4. A sends his utility function u and a query qt to B.
5. B responds with the response rt maximising u, in a manner that depends on the
query and the posterior.
Let us now elaborate. In this framework, the choice of the model family FΘ is dictated by the
problem. The choice of ξ is normally determined by the prior knowledge of B, but we show
that this also affects what level of privacy is achieved. Informally speaking, informative
priors achieve better privacy, as the posterior has a weaker dependency on the data. It
is natural to assume that the prior itself is public, as it should reflect publicly available
information. The statistician’s conclusion from the observed data x is then summarised in
the posterior distribution ξ(θ | x), which remains private.
The second part of the process is the interaction with A . We adopt a decision-theoretic
viewpoint to characterise what the optimal responses to queries should be. More specifically,
we assume the existence of a “true” parameter θ ∈ Θ, and that A has a utility function
uθ(qt, rt), which he wishes to maximise. For example, consider the case where θ = (µ,Σ)
are the parameters of a normal distribution. An example query qt is “what is the expected
value Eθ xi = µ of the distribution?”. The optimal response rt, would then be a real vector
that depends on the utility function. A possible utility function is the negative squared L2
distance:
uθ(qt = “what is the mean?”, rt) = −‖Eθ xi − rt‖22.
While θ is unknown, B has information about it in the form of a posterior distribution.
Using standard decision-theoretic notions, the optimal response of B would maximise the
expected utility Eξ(u | qt, rt, x), where the expectation is taken over the posterior distribu-
tion. However, this deterministic response cannot be differentially private.
In this paper, we promote the use of posterior sampling to respond to queries. The
posterior sampling mechanism draws a set Θˆ of i.i.d. samples from the posterior distribution.
Then, all the responses only depend on the posterior through Θˆ. Since our algorithm only
takes a single sample set Θˆ, further queries by the adversary reveal nothing more about the
data than what can be inferred from Θˆ. The empirical distribution induced by Θˆ serves as
a private surrogate for the exact (non-private) posterior. Consequently, we can respond to
an arbitrary number of queries with a bounded privacy budget, while guaranteeing good
utility for all responses.
We show that if FΘ and ξ are chosen appropriately, this results in differentially-private
responses, as well as robustness of the posterior.1 In addition, we prove upper and lower
bounds on how easy it is for an adversary to distinguish two -close datasets. Finally,
we bound the loss in utility incurred due to privacy. The intuition behind our results
is that robustness and privacy are linked via smoothness. Learning algorithms that are
smooth mappings—their output (e.g., a spam filter) varies little with perturbations to input
1. More specifically, that small changes in the data result in small changes in the posterior in terms of the
KL divergence.
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(e.g., similar training corpora)—are robust: outliers have reduced influence, and adversaries
cannot easily discover unknown information about the data. This suggests that robustness
and privacy can be simultaneously achieved and are in fact deeply linked.
We provide a uniform mathematical treatment of the privacy and robustness properties
of Bayesian inference based on generalised differential privacy to arbitrary dataset distances,
outcome spaces, and distribution families. This paper can be summarised as making the
following distinct contributions:
• Under certain regularity conditions on the prior distribution ξ or likelihood family
FΘ, we show that the posterior distribution is robust : small changes in the dataset
result in small posterior changes.
• We introduce a novel posterior sampling mechanism that is private.2 Unlike other
common mechanisms in differential privacy, our approach sits squarely in the non-
private (Bayesian) learning framework without modification.
• We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for differentially private Bayesian in-
ference.
• We introduce the notion of dataset distinguishability for which we provide finite-sample
bounds for our mechanism: how large would Θˆ need to be for A to distinguish two
datasets with high probability.
• We provide examples of conjugate-pair distributions where our assumptions hold,
including discrete Bayesian networks.
Paper organisation. Section 2 specifies the setting and our assumptions. Section 3
proves results on robustness of Bayesian learning. Section 4 proves our main privacy results.
In particular, Section 4.1 shows that the posterior distribution is differentially private,
Section 4.2 describes our posterior sampling query response algorithm, Section 4.3 derives
bounds on dataset indistinguishability, Section 4.5 shows how to obtain matching lower
bounds for distinguishability, while Section 4.4 shows how utility and privacy can be traded
off within our framework. Examples where our assumptions hold are given in Section 5. We
present a discussion of our results, related work and links to the exponential mechanism and
robust Bayesian inference in Section 6. Appendix A contains proofs of the main theorems.
Finally, Appendix B details proofs of the examples demonstrating our assumptions.
2. Problem Setting
We consider the problem of a Bayesian statistician (B) communicating with an untrusted
third party (A ). B wants to convey useful responses to the queries of A (e.g., how
many people suffer from a disease or vote for a particular party) without revealing private
information about the original data (e.g., whether a particular person has cancer). This
requires communicating information in a way that strikes a balance between utility and
privacy. In this paper, we study the inherent privacy and robustness properties of Bayesian
2. Although previously used e.g., for efficient exploration in reinforcement learning (Thompson, 1933; Os-
band et al., 2013), posterior sampling has not previously been employed for privacy.
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inference and explore the question of whether B can select a prior distribution so that a
computationally unbounded A cannot obtain private information from queries.
2.1 Definitions and Notation
We begin with our notation. Let S be the set of all possible datasets. For example, if X is
a finite alphabet, then we might have S = ⋃∞n=0X n, i.e., the set of all possible observation
sequences over X . However, S can have arbitrary structure and so social network or mo-
bility trace data are also handled in this framework. Probability measures on parameters
θ are usually denoted by ξ, while measures and densities on data are denoted by Pθ or pθ
respectively. Expectations are denoted by Eξ g ,
∫
Θ g(θ) dξ(θ), where the subscript denotes
the underlying distribution with respect to which we are taking expectations. In case of
ambiguity, we explicitly write e.g., Ex∼Pθ f(x) =
∫
S f(x) dPθ(x) to denote which variables
are drawn from which distributions. Finally, we use I {pi} to be the identity function, taking
the value 1 when the predicate pi is true, and 0 otherwise.
2.1.1 Distances Between Datasets
Central to the notions of privacy and robustness, is the concept of distance between datasets.
Firstly, the effect of dataset perturbation on learning depends on the amount of noise
as quantified by some distance. This is useful for characterising robustness to noise or
adversarial manipulation of the data. Secondly, the amount that an attacker can learn
from queries can be quantified in terms of the distance of his guesses to the true dataset.
Finally, it allows for a unified mathematical treatment, as it permits different types of
neighbourhoods to be defined. To model these situations, we equip S with a pseudo-
metric3 ρ : S × S → R+. This generalisation has also been used by Chatzikokolakis et al.
(2013), which has laid the groundwork for metric-based differential privacy. While this
concept has many applications in the context of geographical information systems, we apply
this generalisation of differential privacy without necessarily referring to some underlying
physical distance.
2.1.2 Bayesian Inference
This paper focuses on the Bayesian inference setting, where the statistician B constructs a
posterior distribution from a prior distribution ξ and a training dataset x. More precisely,
we assume that data x ∈ S have been drawn from some distribution Pθ? on S, parameterised
by θ?, from a family of distributions FΘ. B defines a parameter set Θ indexing a family of
distributions FΘ on (S,SS), where SS is an appropriate σ-algebra on S:
FΘ , {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ } ,
and where we use pθ to denote the corresponding densities
4 when necessary. To perform
inference in the Bayesian setting, B selects a prior measure ξ on (Θ,SΘ) reflecting B’s
subjective beliefs about which θ is more likely to be true, a priori; i.e., for any measurable set
B ∈ SΘ, ξ(B) represents B’s prior belief that θ? ∈ B. In general, the posterior distribution
3. Meaning that ρ(x, y) = 0 does not necessarily imply x = y.
4. I.e., the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Pθ relative to some dominating measure ν.
5
Dimitrakakis, Nelson, Zhang, Mitrokotsa and Rubinstein
after observing x ∈ S is:
ξ(B | x) =
∫
B pθ(x) dξ(θ)
φ(x)
, (1)
where φ is the corresponding marginal density given by:
φ(x) ,
∫
Θ
pθ(x) dξ(θ) .
While the choice of the prior is generally arbitrary, this paper shows that its careful selec-
tion can yield good privacy guarantees. Throughout the paper, we shall use the following
simple example to ground our observations and theory. This consists of a finite family of
distributions, on a finite alphabet. Consequently, calculation of the posterior distribution
is always simple. It is also easy to verify our assumptions on this model.
Example 1 (Finite Bernoulli family.) Consider a finite family of distributions FΘ =
{Pθ : θ ∈ Θ } on alphabet X = { 0, 1 }, with θ ∈ [0, 1], such that for any model in the family
and any observation x
Pθ(x) = θ I {x = 1}+ (1− θ) I {x = 0} .
For any sequence of observations x1, . . . , xT , we have, with some abuse of notation,
Pθ(x1, . . . , xT ) =
T∏
t=1
Pθ(xt),
i.e., Pθ defines an i.i.d. distribution on the alphabet. This family corresponds to a set of
Bernoulli models. The set of parameters Θ will be chosen to discretise the parameter space
of Bernoulli distributions over ∆-sized intervals. For this, the k-th model’s parameter will
be θk = ∆k, with ∆ ∈ (0, 1) and k ≤ 1/∆.
For the above family, we can use a uniform prior distribution ξ(θk) = ∆. The posterior
distribution is easily calculated, since we need only sum over a finite number of parameters.
2.1.3 Privacy
We now recall the concept of differential privacy (Dwork, 2006). This states that on neigh-
bouring datasets, a randomised query response mechanism yields (pointwise) similar dis-
tributions. We adopt the view of mechanisms as conditional distributions under which
differential privacy can be seen as a measure of smoothness. In our setting, conditional
distributions conveniently correspond to posterior distributions. These can also be inter-
preted as the distribution of a mechanism that uses posterior sampling, to be introduced
in Section 4.2. The precise definition depends on the notion of neighbourhood, with the
following choice being common:
Definition 1 ((, δ)-differential privacy) A conditional distribution P (· | x) on (Θ,SΘ)
is (, δ)-differentially private if, for all B ∈ SΘ and for any x ∈ S = X n
P (B | x) ≤ eP (B | y) + δ,
for all y in the Hamming-1 neighbourhood of x. That is, y may differ in at most one entry
from x: there is at most one i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that xi 6= yi.
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A typical situation where this definition is employed, is when x, y are matrices and xi is a
single row in the matrix. Then, the datasets are neighbours if a matrix row is changed.5
In our setting, it is reasonable to generalise this to arbitrary dataset spaces S that are
not necessarily product spaces. To do so, we use the notion of differential privacy under a
pseudo-metric ρ on the space of all datasets, which allows for more subtle representations
of attacker knowledge and for a more general treatment:
Definition 2 ((, δ)-differential privacy under ρ.) A conditional distribution P (· | x)
on (Θ,SΘ) is (, δ)-differentially private under a pseudo-metric ρ : S × S → R+ if, for all
B ∈ SΘ and for any x, y ∈ S,
P (B | x) ≤ eρ(x,y)P (B | y) + δρ(x, y) .
In our setting, ρ replaces the notion of neighbourhood. It is of course possible to use ρ that
corresponds to the usual meaning of neighbourhood in differential privacy:
Remark 3 If S = X n and ρ(x, y) = ∑ni=1 I {xi 6= yi} is the Hamming distance, this def-
inition is analogous to standard (, δ)-differential privacy. When considering only (, 0)-
differential privacy or (0, δ)-privacy, it is an equivalent notion.6
Proof For (, 0)-DP, let ρ(x, z) = ρ(z, y) = 1; i.e., the data differ in one element. Then,
from standard DP, we have P (B | x) ≤ eP (B | z) and so obtain P (B | x) ≤ e2P (B |
y) = eρ(x,y)P (B | y). By induction, this holds for any x, y pair. Similarly, for (0, δ)-DP, by
induction we obtain P (B | x) ≤ P (B | y) + δρ(x, y).
Definition 1 allows for privacy against a powerful attacker A , who attempts to match the
empirical distribution induced by the true dataset, by querying the learned mechanism
and comparing its responses to those given by distributions simulated using knowledge of
the mechanism and knowledge of all but one datum—narrowing the dataset down to a
Hamming-1 ball. Indeed the requirement of differential privacy is sometimes too strong
since it may come at the price of utility. Definition 2 allows for a much broader encoding of
the attacker’s knowledge via the selected pseudo-metric. It also allows a more fine-grained
notion of privacy. This is quite useful for geographical information systems, as proposed
by Chatzikokolakis et al. (2013), to which we refer the reader for a broader discussion of
the use of metrics in differential privacy.
Finally, we can show that this generalisation of differential privacy satisfies the standard
composition property.
Theorem 4 (Composition) Let conditional distributions P (· | x) on (Θ,SΘ) be (, δ)-
differentially private under a pseudo-metric ρ : S × S → R+ and P ′(· | x) on (Θ′,S′Θ′) be
(′, δ′)-differentially private under the same pseudo-metric. Then the conditional distribution
on the product space (Θ ×Θ′,SΘ ⊗S′Θ′) given by
Q(B ×B′ | x) = P (B | x)P ′(B′ | x), ∀B ×B′ ∈ SΘ ⊗S′Θ′
satisfies (+ ′, δ + δ′)-differentially private under the pseudo-metric ρ. Here SΘ ⊗S′Θ′ is
the product σ-algebra on Θ ×Θ′.
5. Another common choice for neighbourhoods is to say that two datasets are neighbours if one results
from the other by addition of a row.
6. Making the definition wholly equivalent is possible, but results in an unnecessarily complex definition.
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Proof For any y ∈ S
Q(B ×B′ | x) ≤
[
eρ(x,y)P (B | y) + δρ(x, y)
]
P ′(B′ | x)
≤ eρ(x,y)P (B | y)
[
e
′ρ(x,y)P ′(B′ | y) + δ′ρ(x, y)
]
+ δρ(x, y)
≤ e(+′)ρ(x,y)P (B | y)P ′(B′ | y) + (δ + δ′)ρ(x, y)
2.2 Our Main Assumptions
In the sequel, we show that if the distribution family FΘ or prior ξ satisfies certain assump-
tions, then close datasets x, y ∈ S result in posterior distributions that are close. In that
case, it is difficult for a third party to use such a posterior to distinguish the true dataset
x from similar datasets.
To formalise these notions, we introduce two possible assumptions one could make on
the smoothness of the family FΘ with respect to some metric d on R+. The first assumption
states that the likelihood is smooth for all parameterisations of the family. First, we define
our notion of smoothness. Let f(x, θ) , ln pθ(x) be the log probability of x under θ. The
Lipschitz constant for a parameter value θ is:
`(θ) , inf {u : |f(x, θ)− f(y, θ)| ≤ uρ(x, y)∀x, y ∈ S } . (2)
Our first assumption is uniform smoothness for all parameters.
Assumption 1 (Lipschitz continuity) We assume there exists some L <∞ such that:
`(θ) ≤ L, θ ∈ Θ. (3)
In other words, this assumption says that the log probability is Lipschitz with respect to
ρ for any parameter value. Consider Example 1 for the Bernoulli model. It is easy to see
that a model with ∆-sized intervals satisfies the above assumption with L = ln 1/∆.
However, it may be difficult for this assumption to hold uniformly over Θ in general.
This can be seen by the following counterexample for the Bernoulli family of distributions:
when the parameter is 0, then any sequence x = 0, 0, . . . has probability 1, while any
sequence containing a 1 has probability 0. The same thing occurs when we take ∆→ 0 in
Example 1. To avoid such problems, we relax the assumption by only requiring that B’s
prior probability ξ is concentrated in the regions of the family for which the likelihood is
smoothest:
Assumption 2 (Stochastic Lipschitz continuity; Norkin, 1986) First, define the sub-
set of parameter values
ΘL , { θ ∈ Θ : `(θ) ≤ L } (4)
8
Bayesian Differential Privacy through Posterior Sampling
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
ξ(
Θ
L
)
L
(a) Uniform prior
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
L
0.2 cdf
0.05 cdf
0.2 bound
0.05 bound
L(0.2)
L(0.05)
(b) Exponential prior
Figure 1: The mass of L-Lipschitz parameters, for two finite familes of Bernoulli distribu-
tions with ∆ ∈ { 0.2, 0.05 } (thick lines) together with their respective stochastic Lipschitz
bounds (thin lines) and the corresponding uniform Lipschitz constant L.
to be those parameters for which Lipschitz continuity holds with Lipschitz constant L. Then,
there are some constants c, L0 > 0 such that, for all L ≥ L0:
ξ(ΘL) ≥ 1− exp(−c(L− L0)) . (5)
By not requiring uniform smoothness, this weaker assumption is easier to meet but still
yields useful guarantees. In fact, in Section 5, we demonstrate that this assumption is
satisfied by many important example distribution families. However, it will be illustrative
to consider the discrete Bernoulli family example at this point.
Example 2 (Continuation of Example 1) These conditions can be examined in terms
of the finite family of Example 1. Figure 1 demonstrates the assumptions for ∆ = 0.2 (red
dashed lines) and ∆ = 0.05 (blue solid lines).
In particular, the two thick lines Figure 1a show the probability mass of L-Lipschitz
parameters for the two families. They are both step functions, as the families are discrete.7
The × and ◦ symbols show the corresponding Lipschitz constants for the two families re-
spectively, and we can clearly see ∆ = 0.2 has about half the Lipschitz constant of ∆ = 0.05.
The thinner curves depict the highest lower bound on the probability mass defined in As-
sumption 2. There we see that the higher curve is achieved by ∆ = 0.2.
In order to improve the lower bound, we need to modify our prior distribution on the
family members so as to place less mass on the more sensitive parameters. The result of
this operation is shown in Figure 1b, which uses the prior ξ(θ) ∝ exp(−`(θ)), i.e., it places
exponentially smaller weight in more sensitive parameters. This results in both lower bounds
7. The ∆ = 0.2 family only has two steps, as the Lipschitz constant is symmetric about θ = 0.5.
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being shifted upwards, corresponding to a higher c constant in Assumption 2. Of course,
this has no effect on Assumption 1.
For completeness, we now show that verifying our assumptions for a distribution of a
single random variable lifts to a corresponding property for the product distribution on i.i.d.
samples.
Lemma 5 If FΘ satisfies Assumption 1 (resp. Assumption 2) with respect to pseudo-metric
ρ and constant L (or c), then, for any fixed n ∈ N, the product family FnΘ with densities
(sim. measures) pnΘ({xi }) =
∏n
i=1 pΘ(xi) satisfies the same assumption with respect to:
ρn({xi } , { yi }) =
∑n
i=1 ρ(xi, yi)
and constant L (or c).
2.2.1 Necessary Conditions
Finally, let us discuss whether the above conditions are necessary. In fact, either the first
condition must be true, or a similar condition must hold on the marginals for every possible
dataset pair (x, y). Our second condition can be seen as a specific case of the necessary
condition for the marginals, as explained below.
Theorem 6 For a prior ξ to be differentially private for a family FΘ, either
sup
θ∈Θ
ln
Pθ(x)
Pθ(y)
≤ Lρ(x, y), or ln φ(y)
φ(x)
≤ Lρ(x, y) (6)
for all x, y ∈ X .
Proof If neither condition holds for some pair (x, y) then there is θ such that ln Pθ(x)Pθ(y) >
Lρ(x, y) and ln φ(y)φ(x) > Lρ(x, y). Simply adding the two, we obtain ln
ξ(θ|x)
ξ(θ|y) > 2Lρ(x, y), and
so the resulting posterior is not L-differentially private.
In our main results, we show that the first part of the conditions, which is equivalent to our
first assumption, is also sufficient. However, the second part is too weak to imply differential
privacy on its own.
2.2.2 The Choice of Metric and Sufficient Statistics
The extent to which our assumptions hold for a particular family of distributions FΘ depends
mainly on ρ. The choice of metric is also important for achieving differential privacy with
respect to it. Let us specifically consider metrics defined in terms of a difference in statistics:
ρ(x, y) , ‖τ(x)− τ(y)‖ ,
where τ : S → V is a statistic mapping from datasets to a normed vector space.
Necessity for assumptions. In that case, our assumptions imply that τ must be a
sufficient statistic, since if τ(x) = τ(y) then ρ(x, y) = 0 and it follows that Pθ(x) =
Pθ(y). More generally, ρ must be such that if the distance between x, y is zero, then their
probabilities should be equal. We will see some examples of such statistics for conjugate
distributions in the exponential family in Section 5. That means that we cannot use a
metric which simply ignores part of the data, for example.
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Necessity for differential privacy. Similarly, the very definition of differential privacy
(Definition 2) implies that τ must be a Bayes-sufficient statistic. That means that for any
x, y, it holds
τ(x) = τ(y) ⇒ ξ(B | x) = ξ(B | y) , ∀B ∈ SΘ .
Note that this is a slightly weaker condition than a sufficient statistic, which is necessary
for our assumptions to hold.
2.3 Summary of Results
Given the above assumptions, we show: firstly, that if we choose an informative prior ξ,
the resulting posterior is robust in terms of KL-divergence to small changes in the data.
Secondly, that the posterior distribution is differentially private. Thirdly, that this implies
that sampling from the posterior can be used as part of a differentially-private mechanism.
We complement these with results on how easily an adversary can distinguish two similar
datasets from posterior samples. Finally, we characterise the trade-off between utility and
privacy, stated here informally for ease of exposition:
Claim 1 If A prefers to use the prior ξ?, butB uses a prior ξ satisfying Assumption 1, and
A ’s utility is bounded in [0, 1], the following is true for the posterior sampling mechanism
with N samples:
• The mechanism is 2NL-differentially private.
• A ’s utility loss is O
(
[1− ξ?(ΘL)] +
√
1/N
)
w.h.p., where ΘL is the support of ξ.
The following sections discuss our main results in detail. We begin by proving that
our assumptions result in robust posteriors, in the sense that the KL divergence between
posteriors arising from similar datasets is small. Then we show that they also result in
differentially private posterior distributions, and analyse the resulting posterior sampling
mechanism. We conclude with some examples and a discussion of related work.
3. Robustness of the Posterior Distribution
We now show that the above assumptions provide guarantees on the robustness of the
posterior. That is, if the distance between two datasets x, y is small, then so too is the
distance between the two resulting posteriors, ξ(· | x) and ξ(· | y). We prove this result for
the case where we measure the distance between the posteriors in terms of the well-known
KL-divergence:
D (P ‖ Q) =
∫
S
ln
dP
dQ
dP .
The following theorem shows that any distribution family FΘ and prior ξ satisfying one of
our assumptions is robust, in the sense that the posterior does not change significantly with
small changes to the dataset. It is notable that our mechanisms are simply tuned through
the choice of prior.
Theorem 7 When ξ is a prior distribution on Θ and ξ(· | x) and ξ(· | y) are the respective
posterior distributions for datasets x, y ∈ S, the following results hold:
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1. Under a pseudo-metric ρ and L > 0 satisfying Assumption 1,
D (ξ(· | x) ‖ ξ(· | y)) ≤ 2Lρ(x, y) . (7)
2. Under a pseudo-metric ρ and c > 1 satisfying Assumption 2
D (ξ(· | x) ‖ ξ(· | y)) ≤ CFΘξ
(
1 + 2L0 + c
−1) ρ(x, y) , (8)
where CFΘξ is the ratio between the maximum and marginal likelihoods (9).
Note that the second claim bounds the KL divergence in terms of B’s prior belief that
L is small, which is expressed via the constant c. The larger c is, the less prior mass is
placed in large L and so the more robust inference becomes. Of course, choosing c to be
too large may decrease efficiency.
It is important to also discuss the constant CFΘξ . To get a better intuition, consider the
case where Θ,X are finite. Let θ?ML(x) be the maximum-likelihood estimate for x. Then
we have that:
CFΘξ = maxx
Pθ?ML(x)(x)∑
Θ Pθ(x)ξ(θ)
≤ max
x
1
ξ(θ?ML(x))
, (9)
there is therefore a natural dependency on the prior mass placed on maximum-likelihood
estimators.
4. Privacy and Utility
We next examine the differential privacy of the posterior distribution. We show in Sec-
tion 4.1 that this can be achieved under either of our assumptions. The result can also be
interpreted as the differential privacy of a posterior sampling mechanism for responding to
queries (described in Section 4.2), for which we prove a bound on the utility depending on
the number of samples taken. Section 4.3 examines an alternative notion of privacy, dataset
distinguishability, similar to Wasserman and Zhou (2010). For this, we prove a bound on
privacy, that also depends on the number of samples taken. Together, these exhibit a trade
off between utility and privacy controlled by choosing the number of samples appropriately,
in a manner described in Section 4.4.
4.1 Differential Privacy of Posterior Distributions
We consider our generalised notion of differential privacy for posterior distributions (Defi-
nition 2); and show that the type of differential privacy exhibited by the posterior depends
on which assumption holds.
Theorem 8 1. Under a pseudo-metric ρ and L > 0 satisfying Assumption 1, for all
x, y ∈ S, B ∈ SΘ:
ξ(B | x) ≤ exp{2Lρ(x, y)}ξ(B | y) .
i.e., the posterior ξ is (2L, 0)-differentially private under pseudo-metric ρ.
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2. Under a pseudo-metric ρ and c > 1 satisfying Assumption 2, CFΘξ defined in (9), for
all x, y ∈ S, B ∈ SΘ:
|ξ(B | x)− ξ(B | y)| ≤
√
CFΘξ
2
(1 + 2L0 + c−1) ρ(x, y),
i.e., the posterior ξ is
(
0, O(
√
CFΘξ (L0 + 1/c))
)
-differentially private8 under pseudo-
metric
√
ρ.
The difference between the two bounds’ form is due to the fact that while the first claim
has a direct proof, the second claim arises from the KL divergence bound in Theorem 7.
Finally, we show that posterior distributions are also randomly differentially private.
Corollary 9 Under pseudo-metric ρ, c > 1 and L ≥ L0 > 0 satisfying Assumption 2:
P [∀B ∈ SΘ : ξ(B | x) ≤ exp {2Lρ(x, y)} ξ (B | y) ,∀x, y ∈ S] ≥ 1− exp(−c(L− L0)) .
i.e., the posterior ξ is (2L, 0, exp(−c(L− L0)))-randomly differentially private (Hall et al.,
2011) under pseudo-metric ρ.
This is a conceptually different definition from the original RDP, as the measure over which
the randomness is defined is not the data distribution, but the prior measure ξ.
This property of the posterior distribution directly leads to the definition of a posterior
sampling mechanism which will be differentially private. This is explained in the following
section.
4.2 Posterior Sampling Mechanism
Given that we have a full posterior distribution which is differentially private, we can use
it to define a private mechanism. We may allow the adversary to submit an arbitrary set
of queries { qt } with each qt ∈ Q. Each query warrants a response rt in a set of possible
responses R. The adversary is allowed to condition the queries on our previous responses.
We extend our original approach (Dimitrakakis et al., 2014) to take some utility function
u into account, which scores preferences of responses given a query. The algorithm requires
a prior ξ to be defined on a family FΘ of probability distributions, whose members do
not necessarily generate i.i.d. observations. They could be Markov chains for example.
The first step is to simply draw a number of samples from the posterior, as in the original
approach (Algorithm 2). After the algorithm calculates the posterior distribution ξ(· | x), N
parameter samples are drawn from it, producing a parameter set Θˆ. Thereafter, responses
depend only on the utility function and the sample Θˆ, and we do not draw new samples
after every query. This allows us to work with a fixed privacy budget.
Corollary 10 Algorithm 1 is differentially private under the conditions of Theorem 8,
namely:
1. Under a pseudo-metric ρ and L > 0 satisfying Assumption 1, the algorithm is (2L, 0)-
differentially private under pseudo-metric ρ; or
8. This holds, for example, for hamming distance as in the Beta-Binomial example presented in Lemma 21.
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Algorithm 1 BAPS: Bayesian Posterior Sampling
1: input prior ξ, data x ∈ S
2: Calculate posterior ξ(θ | x).
3: for k = 1, . . . , N do
4: Sample θ(k) ∼ ξ(θ | D).
5: end for
6: return Θˆ =
{
θ(k) : k = 1, . . . , N
}
.
2. Under a pseudo-metric ρ and c > 1 satisfying Assumption 2, CFΘξ defined in (9), the
algorithm is
(
0, O(
√
CFΘξ (L0 + 1/c))
)
-differentially private under pseudo-metric
√
ρ.
Proof This follows directly from Theorems 8 and 4 (composition), as the algorithm sam-
ples from the posterior distribution, which is differentially private.
Utility and optimal responses. We assume the collection of a set of utility functions
U = {uθ : θ ∈ Θ }, such that the optimal response for a given parameter θ is the one
maximising a utility function uθ : Q×R → [0, 1]. If we know the true parameter θ, then we
should respond to any query q with r ∈ arg maxr uθ(q, r). However, since θ is unknown, we
must select a method for conveying the required information. In a Bayesian setting, there
are three main approaches we could employ. The standard methodology is to maximise
expected utility with respect to the posterior. This corresponds to marginalising out θ, and
responding with:
rt ∈ arg max
r
∫
Θ
uθ(qt, r) dξ(θ | x) .
The second is to use the maximum a posteriori value of θ. The final, which we employ here,
is to use sampling; i.e., to reply to each query using parameters sampled from the posterior.
This allows us to reply to arbitrary queries without compromising privacy, since the most
information an adversary could obtain is the set of sampled parameters. By adjusting the
number of samples used, we can easily trade off between privacy and utility.
After this we respond to a series of queries. For the t-th received query qt, the algorithm
returns the optimal response over the sampled parameter set Θˆ, in the manner shown in
Algorithm 2. Since we allow arbitrary queries, the third party could simply ask for Θˆ with
a suitable choice of the utility function. Then if u is bounded, it is easy to show that the
loss due to sampling is bounded.
Algorithm 2 PSAQR: Posterior Sample Query Response
1: input Parameter sample Θˆ.
2: for t = 1, . . . do
3: Observe query qt ∈ Q, perhaps depending on r1, . . . , rt−1 and q1, . . . , qt−1.
4: return rt ∈ arg maxr
∑
θ∈Θˆ uθ(qt, r)
5: end for
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Lemma 11 The returned responses of the PSAQR mechanism have a utility which is within
O
(√
ln(1/δ)/N
)
of the optimal value with probability at least 1− δ for any δ > 0.
Now that we have demonstrated bounds on the utility for the algorithm above, we turn to
the issue of how utility and privacy can be optimally tuned. First, we try and quantify the
amount of samples an adversary needs to distinguish two datasets.
4.3 Distinguishability of Datasets
In this section, we wish to relate the size of the sample Θˆ to the amount of information
about x that can be obtained by the adversary A . More precisely, we need to bound how
well A can distinguish x from all alternative datasets y. Within the posterior sampling
query model, A has to decide whether B’s posterior is ξ(· | x) or ξ(· | y). However, he can
only do so within some neighbourhood  of the original data. In this section, we bound A ’s
error in determining the posterior in terms of the number of samples used. This is analogous
to the dataset-size bounds on queries in interactive models of differential privacy (Dwork
et al., 2006), as well as the point of view of privacy as hypothesis testing (Kairouz et al.,
2015; Wasserman and Zhou, 2010) where an adversary wishes to distinguish the dataset
from two alternatives.
For this section, we consider a utility function whose optimal response is Θˆ. This
corresponds to the most powerful query possible under the model shown in Algorithm 2.
Then, the adversary needs only to construct the empirical distribution to approximate the
posterior up to some sample error. By bounds on the KL divergence between the empirical
and actual distributions we can bound his power in terms of how many samples he needs
in order to distinguish between x and y.
Due to the sampling model, we first require a finite sample bound on the quality of the
empirical distribution. The adversary could attempt to distinguish different posteriors by
forming the empirical distribution on any sub-algebra S.
Lemma 12 For any δ ∈ (0, 1), let M be a finite partition of the sample space S, of size
m ≤ log2
√
1/δ, generating the σ-algebra S = σ(M ). Let x1, . . . , xn ∼ P be i.i.d. samples
from a probability measure P on S, let P|S be the restriction of P on S and let Pˆn|S be the
empirical measure on S. Then, with probability at least 1− δ:∥∥∥Pˆn|S − P|S∥∥∥
1
≤
√
3
n
ln
1
δ
. (10)
We can combine this bound on the adversary’s estimation error with Theorem 7’s bound
on the KL divergence between posteriors resulting from similar data to obtain a measure
of how fine a distinction between datasets the adversary can make after a finite number of
draws from the posterior:
Theorem 13 Under Assumption 1, the adversary can distinguish between data x, y with
probability 1− δ if:
ρ(x, y) ≥ 3
4Ln
ln
1
δ
.
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Under Assumption 2, this becomes:
ρ(x, y) ≥ 6
n
(
CFΘξ c−1 + lnC
FΘ
ξ
) ln 1
δ
.
Consequently, either smoother likelihoods (i.e., decreasing L), or a larger concentration
on smoother likelihoods (i.e., increasing c), increases the effort required by the adversary and
reduces the sensitivity of the posterior. Note that, unlike the results obtained for differential
privacy of the posterior sampling mechanism, these results have the same algebraic form
under both assumptions.
4.4 Trading off Utility and Privacy
By construction, in our setting there are three ways with which to tune privacy. The first
is the choice of family; the second is the choice of prior; and the third is how many samples
N to draw. The choice of family is usually fixed due to other considerations. However, we
have the choice of either tuning the prior, so that we can satisfy our assumptions with some
suitable constants L or c, or by tuning the number of samples N in the posterior sampling
framework.
The following lemma bounds the regret we suffer in terms of utility when the private
posterior we use is ξ, in the case where the posterior we would like to use (assuming no
privacy constraints) was ξ?.
Lemma 14 If our utility is bounded in [0, 1], the private posterior we use is ξ, while the
ideal posterior is ξ?, then the regret suffered is bounded by 2‖ξ − ξ?‖1.
Finally, consider the case where B, being a true Bayesian, is convinced that ξ? is the
correct prior distribution to use, but needs to use the prior ξ in order to achieve privacy. The
following theorem bounds the expected KL divergence between the two resulting posteriors.
Lemma 15 If ∀θ ∈ Θ, | ln ξ?(θ)/ξ(θ)| ≤ η then the expected KL divergence is
Ex∼φ? D(ξ?(· | x)‖ξ(· | x)) ≤ 2η ,
where φ? is the ξ? marginal distribution.
We can now combine Lemmas 11 and 14 with Lemma 15, to obtain the following result:
Corollary 16 If A has a preferred prior ξ?, while the private prior used by B is ξ and it
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 15, then the loss of A in terms of the ξ?-expected utility
is O
(
η +
√
ln(1/δ)/N
)
, with probability at least 1− δ.
Consequently, if A believes the correct prior should be ξ?, he can use the private posterior
sample to make decisions, incurring a small loss. Finally, we already showed that A cannot
distinguish between data that are closer than O (1/N) with high probability. Hence, in this
setting we can tune N to trade off utility and privacy.
The following theorem characterises the link between the choice of prior, the number of
samples, privacy and utility directly. This connects several of our results in one place.
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Theorem 17 If, instead of using a non-private prior ξ?, we use a prior ξ restricted on
ΘL (such that it satisfies Assumption 1 with constant L) and generate N samples from the
posterior, then (a) the sample is 2LN -differentially private and (b) the loss of A in terms
of the ξ?-expected utility is O
(
[1− ξ?(ΘL)] +
√
ln(1/δ)/N
)
, with probability at least 1− δ
for any δ > 0.
Proof For (a) note that due to composition, N repetitions give 2LN -differential privacy.
For (b), let ΘL be the support of ξ. Then, because ξ is the restriction of ξ
? on ΘL, it holds
that:
‖ξ − ξ?‖1 = ξ(ΘL)− ξ?(ΘL) + ξ?(Θ \ΘL)− ξ(Θ \ΘL)
= 2[1− ξ?(ΘL)] .
We now just need to couple this with Lemmas 14 and 11 to directly obtain the stated bound
on the utility.
In practice, our choice of ξ gives us a base amount of privacy that depends only on L. By
keeping ξ fixed and increasing N , we can easily trade off privacy and utility.
Finally, we should note that the adversary could choose any arbitrary estimator ψ to
guess x. Section 4.5 below describes how to apply Le Cam’s method to obtain matching
lower bounds in this case, by defining dataset estimators as a model for the adversary.
4.5 Lower Bounds
It is possible to apply standard minimax theory to obtain lower bounds on the rate of
convergence of the adversary’s estimate to the true data. In order to do so, we can for
example apply the method due to LeCam (1973), which places lower bounds on the expected
distance between an estimator and the true parameter. In order to apply it in our case, we
simply replace the parameter space with the dataset space.
Le Cam’s method assumes the existence of a family of probability measures indexed by
some parameter, with the parameter space being equipped with a pseudo-metric. In our
setting, we use Le Cam’s method in a slightly unorthodox, but very natural manner. Define
the family of probability measures on Θ to be:
Ξ , { ξ(· | x) : x ∈ S } ,
the family of posterior measures in the parameter space, for a specific prior ξ. Consequently,
now S plays the role of the parameter space, while ρ is used as the pseudo-metric. The
original family FΘ plays no further role in this construction, other than a way to specify
the posterior distributions from the prior.
Now let ψ be an arbitrary estimator of the unknown data x. As in (LeCam, 1973), we
extend ρ to subsets of S via
ρ(A,B) , inf { ρ(x, y) : x ∈ A, y ∈ B } , A,B ⊂ S .
Now we can re-state the following well-known lemma for our specific setting.
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Lemma 18 (Le Cam’s method) Let ψ be an estimator of x on Ξ taking values in the
metric space (S, ρ). Suppose that there are well-separated subsets S1,S2 such that ρ(S1,S2) ≥
2δ. Suppose also that Ξ1, Ξ2 are subsets of Ξ such that x ∈ Si for ξ(· | x) ∈ Ξi. Then:
sup
x∈S
Eξ(ρ(ψ, x) | x) ≥ δ sup
ξi∈co(Ξi)
‖ξ1 ∧ ξ2‖ .
This lemma has an interesting interpretation in our case. The quantity
Eξ(ρ(ψ, x) | x) =
∫
Θ
ρ(ψ(θ), x) dξ(θ | x) ,
is the expected distance between the real data x and the guessed data ψ(θ) when θ is drawn
from the posterior distribution. Consequently, it is possible to apply this method directly to
obtain results for specific families of posteriors. These would of course be dependent on the
family, the prior and the metric. While we shall not engage in this exercise, we point the
interested reader to (Yu, 1997), which provides two simple examples with minimax rates of
O(n−4/9) and O(n−4/5).
5. Examples Satisfying our Assumptions
In what follows we study, for different choices of likelihood and corresponding conjugate
prior, what constraints can be placed on the prior’s concentration to guarantee a desired
level of privacy. These case studies closely follow the pattern in differential privacy research
where the main theorem for a new mechanism is a set of sufficient conditions on (e.g.,
Laplace) noise levels to be introduced to a response in order to guarantee a level  of
-differential privacy.
For exponential families, we have the canonical form pθ(x) = h(x) exp
{
η>θ τ(x)−A(ηθ)
}
,
where h(x) is the base measure, ηθ is the distribution’s natural parameter corresponding to
θ, τ(x) is the distribution’s sufficient statistic, and A(ηθ) is its log-partition function. For
distributions in this family, under the absolute log-ratio distance, the family of parameters
ΘL of Assumption 2 must satisfy, for all x, y ∈ S:
∣∣∣ln h(x)h(y) + η>θ (τ(x)− τ(y))∣∣∣ ≤ Lρ(x, y).
If the left-hand side has an amenable form, then we can quantify the set ΘL for which this
requirement holds. Particularly, for distributions where h(x) is constant and τ(x) is scalar
(e.g., Bernoulli, exponential, and Laplace), this requirement simplifies to |τ(x)−τ(y)|ρ(x,y) ≤ Lηθ .
One can then find the supremum of the left-hand side independent from θ, yielding a simple
formula for the feasible L for any θ. For each example, a detailed proof can be found in Ap-
pendix B. Note that in the following examples, we are making the conventional assumption
in machine learning that data are bounded (||x|| ≤ B). Also we use ξ(θ)1[c1,c2] to denote
the trimmed density function obtained by setting the density outside [c1, c2] to zero and
renormalising the density.
We begin with a few simple examples for single observations, that are nevertheless
illustrative.
Lemma 19 (Exponential-Exponential conjugate prior) The exponential distribution
Exp(x; θ) with a trimmed exponential conjugate prior θ ∼ Exp(θ;λ)1[c1,c2], λ > 0, satisfies
Assumption 2 with parameter c = λ, L0 = c1, C
FΘ
ξ = c2/min
{
c1e
−c1B, c2e−c2B
}
and metric
ρ(x, y) = |x− y|.
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Consequently, the trimmed-exponential prior results in a posterior sampling mechanism
that is (0, δ)-DP under ρ, with δ =
√
1
2C
FΘ
ξ (1 + 2c1 + 1/λ). It is also (0, δ)-DP under the
classical definition if x, y ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 20 (Laplace-Exponential conjugate prior) The distribution Laplace(x; s, µ)
with a trimmed exponential conjugate prior 1/s = θ ∼ Exp(θ;λ)1[c1,c2], µ ∈ R, s ≥ 1/L,
λ > 0 satisfies Assumption 2 with parameters c = λ, L0 = c1,
CFΘξ =

c2
2min
{
1
2c2
, 1
2c1
exp
(−B−µ
c1
)} , x < µ
c2
2min
{
1
2c2
, 1
2c1
exp
(
µ−B
c1
)} , x ≥ µ ,
and metric ρ(x, y) = |x− y|.
It should come as no surprise that the same type of (0, δ)-privacy is achieved for the Laplace
distribution with a trimmed exponential prior. Now we move on to an example from which
we draw multiple samples.
Lemma 21 (Beta-Binomial conjugate prior) The Binomial distribution Binom(θ, n),
with prior θ ∼ Beta(α, β), α = β > 1 satisfies Assumption 2 for L0 = lnn, c = 2−2α+1/B(α),
where B(α) denotes the beta function with parameters α = β,
CFΘξ = B(α)/B
(
n+ 2α− 1
2
,
n+ 2α+ 1
2
)
and metric ρ(x, y) = ‖x− y‖1, where x, y ∈ {0, 1}n.
This is an example of a conjugate prior pair that is (0, δ)-DP without trimming the prior,
with δ =
√
1
2C
FΘ
ξ (1 + 2 lnn+ 2
2α−1B(α)). Unfortunately, δ is increasing with n, and
as Zheng (2015) shows, this result is essentially unimprovable with direct posterior sampling
unless the prior is trimmed.
We next present two results on normal distributions.
Lemma 22 (Normal distribution with known mean and unknown variance) The
normal distribution N(x;µ, σ2) with a trimmed exponential prior 1/σ2 = θ ∼ Exp(θ;λ)1[c1,c2]
satisfies Assumption 2 with parameter c = 2λmax{ |µ|,1 } , L0 =
c1max{ |µ|,1 }
2 ,
CFΘξ = min
{√
c2/c1 exp
(
c1c
2
2
2
)
, exp
(
c32
2
)}
and metric ρ(x, y) =
∣∣x2 − y2∣∣+ 2 |x− y|.
This example is interesting, because privacy is achieved under a rather unusual metric.
However, note that the posterior is classically (0, 3δ)-DP for data in [0, 1].
Unbounded observation spaces are generally a problem for privacy, even for finite pa-
rameter spaces, generally because likelihoods become vanishingly small, thus making log
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likelihood ratios arbitrarily large. However, the following two examples circumvent this
problem. In the first example, we consider a general multivariate extension of Lemma 22.
In the second we consider the case of discrete Bayesian networks, where privacy depends
on the network connectivity and the probability of rare events—we have also considered
posterior sampling of networks under complementary conditions, and output perturbation
applied to posterior updates, in recent work (Zhang et al., 2016). In these examples, data
is usually not i.i.d. (depending on the choice of network or covariance matrix) and the
observation space is not a product space.
Lemma 23 (Multivariate normal distribution) The multivariate normal distribution
N(x;µ,A−1) satisfies our Assumption 1 with L = 12(
∑n
i=1 λ
2
i )
1
2 max{1, ||µ||2} under metric
ρ(x, y) = ||xx> − yy>||F + 2||x − y||2. When µ = 0, Assumption 1 is satisfied with L =
1
2(
∑n
i=1 λ
2
i )
1
2 under metric ρ(x, y) = ||(xx> − yy>)||F .
Once more, we achieved (, 0)-DP under our metric, which implies a (3, 0) classical DP for
bounded data.
Lemma 24 (Discrete Bayesian networks) Consider a family of discrete Bayesian net-
works on K variables, FΘ = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ }. More specifically, each member Pθ, is a distri-
bution on a finite space S = ∏Kk=1 Sk and we write Pθ(x) for the probability of any outcome
x = (x1, . . . , xK) in S. Let ε , minθ,xk,xP(k) Pθ(xk | xP(k)), be the smallest conditional
probability in the graph, where P(k) are the parents of node k.
Our observations can be independent samples
{
xt : t ∈ [T ]} of dependent variables xt1, . . . , xtk.
Define the connectivity vector v ∈ NK such that vk = 1 + deg(k), where deg(k) is the out-
degree of node K. We now define the distance between two datasets x, y to be
ρ(x, y) , v>δ(x, y), δk(x, y) ,
T∑
t=1
I {xk,t 6= yk,t} .
Then Assumption 1 is satisfied with L = ln 1/ε.
Consequently, discrete Bayesian networks, endowed with any prior on the family given in the
above example, are (2 ln 1/ε, 0)-DP under ρ. This also implies that they are 2‖v‖∞ ln 1/ε-
DP under the classical definition.
A simple application of this example is to data drawn from a Markov model on a
finite state space. In particular, consider a time-homogeneous family of transition matrices
θi,j , Pθ(xt+1 = i | xt = j). Then a prior consisting of product of truncated Dirichlet
distributions that bound all multinomial probabilities above ε satisfies our assumptions and
results in a 4 ln 1/ε-DP mechanism.
The above examples demonstrate that our assumptions are reasonable. In fact, for
several of them we recover standard choices of prior distributions. However, for the privacy
guarantees to be reasonable, it is best to restrict the prior to a set of parameters that is not
very sensitive.
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6. Discussion
We have presented a unifying framework for private and secure inference in a Bayesian set-
ting. Under concentration conditions on the prior, we have shown that Bayesian inference
is both robust and private. Firstly, we prove that similar datasets result in posterior distri-
butions with small KL divergence. Secondly, we establish that the posterior is differentially
private. This allows us to use a general posterior sampling mechanism for responding to
queries, where privacy and utility are easy to trade off by adjusting the number of samples
taken.
Owing to the fact that no additional machinery is required, this framework may serve
as a fundamental building block for more sophisticated, private Bayesian inference. As
an additional step towards this goal, we have demonstrated the application of our frame-
work to deriving analytical expressions for well-known distribution families, and for dis-
crete Bayesian networks. Finally, we bounded the amount of effort required of an attacker
to breach privacy when observing samples from the posterior. This serves as a principled
guide for how much access can be granted to querying the posterior, while still guaranteeing
privacy.
Conversion of our results to the neighbourhood formulation. We state most of our results
on specific models using a distance based on a sufficient statistic. Hence, to convert these
to standard differential privacy, we only need to bound the ρ-distance of any neighbouring
datasets. A good example are DBNs, where the case ρ(x, y) = 1 corresponds exactly to
that of one record changing in a databse.
Practical application of our results. In general, it is hard to verify whether an existing
model family will satisfy DP, because it implies checking whether the log-likelihood function
is Lipschitz. Some parametric conjugate families, like the ones we examined in the examples,
are amenable to analytic treatment. In practice, though, this might not be possible. It is
for this reason that we propose to use rejection sampling in order to sample from the
truncated posterior distribution. In particular, it is possible to resample from the posterior
distribution, until a sample within the allowed interval of parameters is obtained. This is
an approach we recently used in an application paper successfully (Zhang et al., 2016).
6.1 Related Work
In the past, little research in differential privacy focused on the Bayesian paradigm, with Dim-
itrakakis et al. (2014) being the first to establish conditions for differentially-private Bayesian
inference. Nevertheless, our paper has many interesting links with both previous and follow
up work, with respect to differential privacy, robustness and Bayesian inference, which we
outline below. First, we discuss relations to other mechanisms achieving differential privacy
and theoretical works about differential privacy; secondly, we discuss related work on the
connection between robustness and privacy; and we conclude the related work section with
a discussion of previous versions of this paper and follow-up work.
6.1.1 Differential Privacy
In our paper, we employ a Bayesian framework whereby optimal responses are charac-
terised by the fact that they maximise expected utility. In Bayesian statistical decision
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theory (Berger, 1985; Bickel and Doksum, 2001; DeGroot, 1970), learning is cast as a sta-
tistical inference problem and decision-theoretic criteria are used as a basis for assessing,
selecting and designing procedures. In particular, for a given utility function, the Bayes-
optimal procedure maximises the expected utility under the posterior distribution.
In our setting, however, decisions using the data are not taken by the statistician B.
Instead, A provides a utility function, and trusts B to give him responses to queries
that maximise expected utility. However B must also balance the need for privacy of the
data provider, which results in some utility loss for A . This is naturally captured by the
difference in utility by making the decision private. This idea had already been explored in
the exponential mechanism by McSherry and Talwar (2007), which connected differential
privacy to mechanism design.
The exponential mechanism can be seen as a generalisation of the Laplace mechanism,
which adds Laplace noise to released statistics (Dwork et al., 2006). The exponential mech-
anism releases a response with probability exponential in a utility function describing the
usefulness of each response, with the best response having maximal utility. An alternate ap-
proach, employed for privatising regularised empirical-risk minimisation (Chaudhuri et al.,
2011), is to alter the inferential procedure itself, in that case by adding a random term to
the primal objective. We view our posterior sampling mechanism as a Bayesian counter-
part. Further results on the accuracy of the exponential mechanism with respect to the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance are given in (Wasserman and Zhou, 2010), which introduced
the concept of privacy as hypothesis testing where an adversary wishes to distinguish two
datasets. This is similar to our notion of dataset distinguishability.
Learning from private data. In a different direction, Duchi et al. (2013) provided
information-theoretic bounds for private learning. This essentially represents the proto-
col for interacting with an adversary as an arbitrary conditional distribution, rather than
restricting it to specific mechanisms or models. In this way, they obtain fundamental bounds
on rates of convergence from differentially-private views of data.
Bayesian inference and privacy. Other work at the intersection of privacy and Bayesian
inference includes that of Williams and McSherry (2010) who applied Bayesian inference
to improve the utility of differentially-private releases by computing posteriors in a noisy
measurement model. In a similar vein, Xiao and Xiong (2012) used Bayesian credible
intervals to respond to queries with as high utility as possible, subject to a privacy budget.
In the PAC-Bayesian setting, Mir (2012) showed that the Gibbs estimator (McSherry and
Talwar, 2007) is differentially private. While their algorithm corresponds to a posterior
sampling mechanism, it is a posterior found by minimising risk bounds; by contrast, our
results are purely Bayesian and come from conditions on the prior. It is also worthwhile
noting that our Assumption 1 can in some cases be made equivalent to the definition of
Pufferfish privacy (Kifer and Machanavajjhala, 2014), a privacy concept with Bayesian
semantics. Thus, our results imply that in some cases Pufferfish privacy also results in
differential privacy. Finally, independently to our preliminary work (Dimitrakakis et al.,
2014), Wang et al. (2015) later proved differential privacy results for Gaussian processes
under similar assumptions.
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6.1.2 Robustness and Privacy
Dwork and Lei (2009) made the first connection between (frequentist) robust statistics
and differential privacy, developing mechanisms for the interquartile, median and B-robust
regression. While robust statistics are designed to operate near an ideal distribution, they
can have prohibitively high global, worst-case sensitivity. In this case privacy was still
achieved by performing a differentially-private test on local sensitivity before release (Dwork
and Smith, 2009). In later work, Dwork et al. (2015) show that differentially-private views
of the data result in good generalisation abilities. We discuss this more extensively in
Section 6.1.3.
In a similar vein Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012) drew a quantitative connection between
robust statistics and differential privacy by providing finite-sample convergence rates for
differentially-private plug-in statistical estimators in terms of the gross error sensitivity,
a common measure of robustness. These bounds can be seen as complementary to ours
because our Bayesian estimators do not have private views of the data but use a suitably-
defined prior instead.
Smoothness of the learning map, achieved here for Bayesian inference by appropriate
concentration of the prior, is related to algorithmic stability which is used in statistical
learning theory to establish error rates (Bousquet and Elisseeff, 2002). Rubinstein et al.
(2012) used γ-uniform stability to calibrate the level of noise when using the Laplace mech-
anism to achieve differential privacy for the SVM. Hall et al. (2013) extended this technique
to adding Gaussian process noise for differentially private release of infinite-dimensional
functions lying in an RKHS.
In the Bayesian setting, robustness is typically handled through maximin policies. This
is done by assuming that the prior distribution is selected arbitrarily by nature. In the
field of robust statistics, the minimax asymptotic bias of a procedure incurred within an
ε-contamination neighbourhood is used as a robustness criterion giving rise to the notions of
a procedure’s influence function and breakdown point to characterise robustness (Hampel
et al., 1986; Huber, 1981). In a Bayesian context, robustness appears in several guises
including minimax risk, robustness of the posterior within ε-contamination neighbourhoods,
and robust priors (Berger, 1985). In this context Gru¨nwald and Dawid (2004) demonstrated
the link between robustness in terms of the minimax expected score of the likelihood function
and the (generalised) maximum entropy principle, whereby nature is allowed to select a
worst-case prior.
6.1.3 Previous Versions and Follow Up Work
Finally, we note that preliminary versions of this work appeared on arXiv (Dimitrakakis
et al., 2013. Latest version 2015.) and ALT (Dimitrakakis et al., 2014). This version cor-
rects technical issues with one proof, which affected the leading constants. We also replaced
the original mechanism with one taking a fixed sample, which allows us to maintain a fixed
privacy budget for an arbitrary number of queries. We make a novel use of Le Cam’s method
to prove lower bounds on indistinguishability, and we complement our original bounds with
bounds for the utility of the mechanism. Finally, we discuss the relationship between poste-
rior sampling, the exponential mechanism and the safe Bayesian generalisation of Bayesian
inference. Follow-up work includes: Wang et al. (2015) who, under similar assumptions
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proved differential privacy results for Gibbs samplers; Zheng (2015) who improved some
of our original bounds and also presented new results for other members of the exponen-
tial family; and Zhang et al. (2016) who recently initiated the exploration of the posterior
sampler in probabilistic graphical models on multiple random variables.
Another important follow up work is that of Dwork et al. (2015). They have shown that
any differentially private algorithm results in robustness, in the sense that the divergence
between posterior distribution arising from similar data is small. This has a direct impact
on the generalisation ability of statistical models and inferences drawn, and consequently
allows for what they call the “re-usable hold-out”. In our work, on the other hand, we have
shown that with the right choice of prior, Bayesian inference is both private and robust.
We have also shown that if the posterior distribution is robust, then it is also differentially
private. In conclusion, robustness and privacy appear to be deeply linked, as our works
have jointly shown conditions when one implies the other in three different ways: not only
the same sufficient conditions can achieve both privacy and robustness, but privacy can also
imply robustness, and robustness implies privacy. Further links between the two concepts
are likely, as explained in the next section.
6.2 Future Directions
Although we have shown how Bayesian inference can already be differentially private by
appropriately setting the prior, we have not examined how this affects learning. While
larger c improves privacy, it also concentrates the prior so much that learning would be
inhibited. Thus, c could be chosen to optimise the trade-off between privacy and learning.
However, we believe that the choice of the number of samples is easier to control.
Other future directions include investigating the links between posterior sampling and
the exponential mechanism, as well as with the safe Bayesian approach (Gru¨nwald, 2012) to
inference. Consider an exponential mechanism which, given a utility function u : Θ×Q → R
and a base measure µ on Θ returns θ ∈ Θ sampled from the density
f(θ) ∝ eu(θ,q) dµ(θ)
dλ
.
As also noted by Wang et al. (2015), this has a similar form to the posterior distribution, by
setting u(θ, q) = ln pθ(x) and setting µ = ξ to the prior. This idea was used independently
by Zhang et al. (2016) for releasing MAP point estimates. In this framework, privacy is
achieved by setting  to a sufficiently small value. However, it is interesting to note that this
is how Gru¨nwald (2012) obtains robustness results for modified Bayesian inference. This
implies that in some cases we can gain both privacy and efficiency. We note that in our
case, we have proven that privacy is attainable by altering the prior, which corresponds to
the base measure in the exponential mechanism. Consequently, we believe it is worthwhile
examining settings where adjusting both  and the prior measure may be advantageous.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Main Results
Proof of Lemma 5 For Assumption 1, the proof follows directly from the definition of
the absolute log-ratio distance; namely,
| ln pnθ ({xi })− ln pnθ ({ yi })| ≤
∑n
i=1 | ln pθ(xi)− ln pθ(yi)|
≤ L∑ni=1 ρ(xi, yi) .
For Assumption 2, consider sub-family ΘL from Eq. (4) for marginal pθ and pseudo-
metric ρ, and define the corresponding sub-family ΘnL in terms of product distribution p
n
θ
and pseudo-metric ρn. Then the same argument as above shows that ΘL ⊆ ΘnL. Hence, the
same prior and parameter c yield the lower bound of Eq. (5), for ΘnL.
Proof of Theorem 7 Let us now tackle claim 1. First, we can decompose the KL-
divergence into two parts.
D (ξ(· | x) ‖ ξ(· | y)) =
∫
Θ
ln
dξ(θ | x)
dξ(θ | y) dξ(θ | x)
=
∫
Θ
ln
pθ(x)
pθ(y)
dξ(θ | x) +
∫
Θ
ln
φ(y)
φ(x)
dξ(θ | x)
≤
∫
Θ
∣∣∣∣ln pθ(x)pθ(y)
∣∣∣∣ dξ(θ | x) + ∫
Θ
ln
φ(y)
φ(x)
dξ(θ | x)
≤ Lρ(x, y) +
∣∣∣∣ln φ(y)φ(x)
∣∣∣∣ . (11)
From Assumption 1, pθ(y) ≤ exp(Lρ(x, y))pθ(x) for all θ so:
φ(y) =
∫
Θ
pθ(y) dξ(θ)
≤ exp(Lρ(x, y))
∫
Θ
pθ(x) dξ(θ) = exp(Lρ(x, y))φ(x) .
Combining this with (11) we obtain
D (ξ(· | x) ‖ ξ(· | y)) ≤ 2Lρ(x, y) .
Claim 2 is dealt with similarly. Once more, we can break down the distance in parts. In
more detail, we first write:
D (ξ(· | x) ‖ ξ(· | y)) ≤
∫
Θ
∣∣∣∣ln pθ(x)pθ(y)
∣∣∣∣ dξ(θ | x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
∫
Θ
ln
φ(y)
φ(x)
dξ(θ | x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
,
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as before. Now, let us re-write the A term as∫
Θ
∣∣∣∣ln pθ(x)pθ(y)
∣∣∣∣ pθ(x)φ(x) dξ(θ) ≤ supθ′ pθ′(x)φ(x)
∫
Θ
∣∣∣∣ln pθ(x)pθ(y)
∣∣∣∣ dξ(θ) ,
so that the left-hand side term is the ratio between the maximal likelihood and marginal
likelihood. Using the same steps, we can bound B in the same manner.
Now, let us define a data-dependent and a data-independent bound:
CFΘξ (x) , sup
θ
pθ(x)
φ(x)
, CFΘξ , sup
x
CFΘξ (x) .
Replacing, we obtain:
D (ξ(· | x) ‖ ξ(· | y)) ≤ CFΘξ
∫
Θ
∣∣∣∣ln pθ(x)pθ(y)
∣∣∣∣ dξ(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
∫
Θ
ln
φ(y)
φ(x)
dξ(θ | x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
Now, to bound the individual terms, we start from A and note that theorem 3 of (Norkin,
1986) on the Lipschitz property of the expectation of stochastic Lipschitz functions applies.
Theorem 25 (Norkin, 1986) If ξ is a probability measure on Θ and f : S × Θ → R is a
ξ-measurable function, such that for any θ ∈ Θ, f(·, θ) is `(θ)-Lipschitz, then the function
fξ(x) , Eξ f(x, θ) is Lξ-Lipschitz, where  Lξ = Eξ `(θ).
Recall that the expectation of a non-negative random variable can be written in terms
of its CDF F as
∫∞
0 [1− F (t)] dt. In our case, `(θ) is a random variable on Θ, and we can
write its cumulative distribution function as
F (t) , ξ ({ θ ∈ Θ : `(θ) ≤ t }) = ξ(Θt) ,
by the definition of Θt. It follows that ln pθ(x) is Lξ-Lipschitz, where through the formula
for the expectation of positive variables:
Lξ =
∫ ∞
0
[1− ξ(Θt)] dt ≤ L0ξ(ΘL0) + [1− ξ(ΘL0)]
∫ ∞
0
e−ct dt ≤ L0 + c−1 . (12)
So, term A becomes CFΘξ
(
L0 + c
−1) ρ(x, y).
Now let us move on to term B. For technical reasons, we start by considering a pair
x, y such that ρ(x, y) ≤ c − 1. This also implies that c > 1, since the distance cannot be
negative.
φ(x)
φ(y)
(a)
=
∫
Θ
pθ(x)
φ(y)
dξ(θ)
(b)
≤
∫
Θ
pθ(y)e
`(θ)ρ(x,y)
φ(y)
dξ(θ)
(c)
≤ CFΘξ
∫
Θ
e`(θ)ρ(x,y) dξ(θ) . (13)
Note that
{
θ ∈ Θ : e`(θ)ρ(x,y) ≤ t} = { θ ∈ Θ : `(θ) ≤ ρ(x, y)−1 ln t} = Θρ(x,y)−1 ln t. So the
CDF of the random variable e`(θ) is F (t) = ξ(Θρ(x,y)−1 ln t). Then:
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For positive random variables, EXρ = ρ
∫∞
0 t
ρ−1[1−F (t)]dt. Applying this to our case,
we get:
Eξ e`(θ)ρ(x,y) = Eξ[e`(θ)ρ(x,y) | ` ≤ L0]ξ(ΘL0) + Eξ[e`(θ)ρ(x,y) | ` > L0][1− ξ(ΘL0)]
≤ eL0ρ(x,y) + ρ(x, y)
∫ ∞
t0
tρ(x,y)−1[1− ξ(Θln t)] dt
≤ eL0ρ(x,y) + ρ(x, y)
∫ ∞
t0
eln t[ρ(x,y)−1]e−c(ln t−L0) dt (where t0 = eL0)
= eL0ρ(x,y) + ρ(x, y)
∫ ∞
t0
eln t[ρ(x,y)−c−1]+cL0 dt
= eL0ρ(x,y) + ρ(x, y)ecL0
∫ ∞
t0
tρ(x,y)−c−1 dt
= eL0ρ(x,y) + ρ(x, y)ecL0
t
ρ(x,y)−c
0
c− ρ(x, y)
= eL0ρ(x,y) + ρ(x, y)ecL0
eL0(ρ(x,y)−c)
c− ρ(x, y)
≤ eL0ρ(x,y) + ρ(x, y)ecL0eL0(ρ(x,y)−c)
= eL0ρ(x,y) + ρ(x, y)eL0ρ(x,y) = (1 + ρ(x, y))eL0ρ(x,y) ≤ e(1+L0)ρ(x,y).
Consequently, lnφ(x)/φ(y) ≤ CFΘξ (1 + L0)ρ(x, y).
To handle larger distances ρ, we can simply apply the above result repeatedly between
k datasets z1, . . . , zk, where z1 = x, zk = y and such that ρ(zi, zi+1) < c− 1.9 By chaining
logarithmic ratios, i.e., using the fact that lnφ(x)/φ(y) = lnφ(x)/φ(z) + lnφ(z)/φ(y) we
can now extend our result to general pairs for term B. Replacing those terms, we now
obtain the final result.
D (ξ(· | x) ‖ ξ(· | y)) ≤ CFΘξ
(
1 + 2L0 + c
−1) ρ(x, y) .
Proof of Theorem 8 For part 1, we assumed that there is an L > 0 such that ∀x, y ∈
S,
∣∣∣log pθ(x)pθ(y) ∣∣∣ ≤ Lρ(x, y), thus implying pθ(x)pθ(y) ≤ exp{Lρ(x, y)}. Further, in the proof of
Theorem 7, we showed that φ(y) ≤ exp{Lρ(x, y)}φ(x) for all x, y ∈ S. From Eq. (1), we
can then combine these to bound the posterior of any B ∈ SΘ as follows for all x, y ∈ S:
ξ(B | x) =
∫
B
pθ(x)
pθ(y)
pθ(y) dξ(θ)
φ(y)
· φ(y)
φ(x)
≤ exp{2Lρ(x, y)}ξ(B | y) .
For part 2, note that from Theorem 2 that the KL divergence of the posteriors under
assumption is bounded by (8). Now, recall Pinsker’s inequality (cf. Fedotov et al., 2003):
D (Q‖P ) ≥ 1
2
‖Q− P‖21 . (14)
9. Technically, the dataset space is a complete metric space for the intermediate points to exist.
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This yields: |ξ(B | x)− ξ(B | y)| ≤
√
1
2D (ξ(· | x) ‖ ξ(· | y)) ≤
√
1
2C
FΘ
ξ (1 + 2L0c
−1) ρ(x, y).
Proof of Lemma 11 Sampling N times from the posterior, gives us the following es-
timate of the utility function uˆξ(q, r) =
1
N
∑
θ∈Θˆ uθ(q, r), which with probability at least
1 − δ satisfies |uˆξ(q, r) − u(q, r)| <
√
ln(2/δ)
2N = , ∀r, q, via Hoeffding’s inequality and the
boundedness of u. Consequently, we can be at most 2-away from the optimal.
Proof of Lemma 12 (Note that in this proof, ε, δ do not refer to the privacy parameters.)
We use the inequality due to Weissman et al. (2003) on the `1 norm, which states that for any
multinomial distribution P with m outcomes, the `1 deviation of the empirical distribution
Pˆn after n draws from the multinomial satisfies:
P
(∥∥∥Pˆn − P∥∥∥
1
≥ ε
)
≤ (2m − 2)e− 12nε2 , ∀ε > 0 .
The right hand side is bounded by em ln 2−
1
2
nε2 . Substituting ε =
√
3
n ln
1
δ :
P
(∥∥∥Pˆn − P∥∥∥
1
≥
√
3
n
ln
1
δ
)
≤ em ln 2− 32 ln 1δ
≤ elog2
√
1
δ
ln 2− 3
2
ln 1
δ
= e
1
2
ln 1
δ
− 3
2
ln 1
δ
= δ .
where the second inequality follows from m ≤ log2
√
1/δ.
Proof of Theorem 13 Recall that the data processing inequality states that, for any
sub-algebra S: ∥∥Q|S − P|S∥∥1 ≤ ‖Q− P‖1 .
Using this and Pinsker’s inequality (14) we obtain:
2Lρ(x, y) ≥ D (ξ(· | x)‖ξ(· | y))
≥ 1
2
‖ξ(· | x)− ξ(· | y)‖21
≥ 1
2
∥∥ξ|S(· | x)− ξ|S(· | y)∥∥21 .
On the other hand, due to (10) the adversary’s `1 error in the posterior distribution is
bounded by
√
3
n ln
1
δ with probability 1− δ. In order for him to be able to distinguish the
two different posteriors, it must hold that∥∥ξ|S(· | x)− ξ|S(· | y)∥∥1 ≥
√
3
n
ln
1
δ
.
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Using the above inequalities, we can bound the error in terms of the distinguishability of
the real dataset x from an arbitrary set y as:
4Lρ(x, y) ≥ 3
n
ln
1
δ
.
Rearranging, we obtain the required result. The second case is treated similarly to obtain:(
CFΘξ c
−1 + lnCFΘξ
)
ρ(x, y)/2 ≥ 3
n
ln
1
δ
.
Proof of Lemma 14 Let r, r? be the optimal responses under ξ, ξ? respectively. For
notational convenience, let uξ =
∫
Θ uθ dξ(θ) denote the expected utility under a belief ξ.
Then our regret is
uξ(q, r)− uξ(q, r?) = uξ(q, r)− uξ?(q, r)
+ uξ?(q, r)− uξ?(q, r?)
+ uξ?(q, r
?)− uξ(q, r?)
≤ 2 ‖ξ − ξ?‖1 .
This follows from the fact that
uξ(q, r)− uξ?(q, r) =
∫
Θ
uθ(q, r) d[ξ − ξ?](θ)
≤ ‖u‖∞‖ξ − ξ?‖1
and then using the boundedness of u. The third term is dealt with identically. For the
second term, note that uξ?(q, r)− uξ?(q, r?) ≤ 0 since r? maximises uξ? .
Proof of Lemma 15 Let φ?(x) =
∫
Θ pθ(x) dξ
?(x) be the prior marginal distribution.
Then the ξ?-expected KL divergence between the two posteriors is
∑
x
∫
Θ
ln
dξ?(θ | x)
dξ(θ | x) dξ
?(θ | x)φ?(x)
≤
∑
x
∫
Θ
(∣∣∣∣ln dξ?(θ)dξ(θ)
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ln φ(x)φ?(x)
∣∣∣∣) dξ?(θ | x)φ?(x)
≤ 2η .
The first term
∣∣∣ln dξ?(θ)dξ(θ) ∣∣∣ is bounded by η by assumption. From the same assumption, it
follows that φ(x) =
∫
Θ pθ(x) dξ(θ) ≤
∫
Θ pθ(x)e
η dξ?(θ) = eηφ?(x), and so the second term
is also bounded by η.
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Appendix B. Proofs of Examples
Proof of Lemma 19 Since Exp(x; θ) is monotonic decreasing in x and concave as a
function of θ, we have inf{||x||≤B,θ∈[c1,c2]}Exp(x; θ) = min
{
c1e
−c1B, c2e−c2B
} ≤ φ(x). Then
we have
CFΘξ = c2/min
{
c1e
−c1B, c2e−c2B
}
.
Next we compute the absolute log-ratio distance for any x1 and x2 according to the
exponential likelihood function:
| ln pθ(x1)− ln pθ(x2)| = θ|x1 − x2| .
Thus, for θ ∈ [c1, c2], under Assumption 2, using ρ(x, y) = |x − y|, the set of feasible
parameters for any L > c1 is ΘL = (c1, L). Note the density of the renormalized exponential
prior on [c1, c2] is given by Kλe
−λθ, where K = (e−λc1 − e−λc2)−1. Thus the CDF at L of
this density is K
(
e−λc1 − e−λL) for L ∈ [c1, c2] and 1 for L ≥ c2. It is natural to choose L0
to be c1. Then we need to find c such that
ξ(ΘL) =
∫ L
c1
Kλe−λθdθ = K(e−λc1 − e−λL) ≥ 1− e−c(L−c1)
for L ∈ (c1, c2). By plugging K into the inequality, we have
e−c(L−c1) ≥ e
−λ(L−c2) − 1
e−λ(c1−c2) − 1 .
Since e−λ(L−c2) ≤ e−λ(c1−c2), it is sufficiency to find c such that e−c(L−c1) ≥ e−λ(L−c1).
Therefore we can have c = λ.
Proof of Lemma 20 Note that Laplace(x; s, µ) is monotonic decreasing in x if x < µ,
and increasing in x if x ≥ µ. Since Laplace(x; s, µ) is concave as a function of s, we have
φ(t) ≥ min
{
1
2c2
, 12c1 exp
(
−B−µ
c1
)}
if x < µ and φ(t) ≥ min
{
1
2c2
, 12c1 exp
(
µ−B
c1
)}
if x ≥ µ.
Thus, we can take
CFΘξ =

c2
2min
{
1
2c2
, 1
2c1
exp
(−B−µ
c1
)} , x < µ
c2
2min
{
1
2c2
, 1
2c1
exp
(
µ−B
c1
)} , x ≥ µ .
For any x1 and x2, the absolute log-ratio distance for this distribution can be bounded as
| ln pµ,s(x1)− ln pµ,s(x2)|
=1s |‖x1 − µ‖ − ‖x2 − µ‖| ≤ 1s‖x1 − x2‖ ,
where the inequality follows from the triangle inequality on ‖ · ‖. Thus, if we use ρ(x, y) =
‖x − y‖, the set of feasible parameters for Assumption 2 is µ ∈ R and 1s = θ ≤ L. Again
we can use the trimmed exponential prior with rate parameter λ > 0 for the inverse scale,
1
s , and similar to the previous example, Assumption 2 is satisfied with c = λ and L0 = c1.
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Proof of Lemma 21 Here, we consider data drawn from a Binomial distribution with a
beta prior on its proportion parameter, θ. Thus, the likelihood and prior functions are
pθ,n(X = k) =
(
n
k
)
θk(1− θ)n−k
ξ0(θ) =
1
B(a,b)θ
a−1(1− θ)b−1 ,
where k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, a, b ∈ R+ and B(a, b) is the beta function. The resulting posterior
is a Beta-Binomial distribution. Again we consider the application of Assumption 2 to this
Beta-Binomial distribution. For this purpose, we must quantify the parameter sets ΘL for
a given L > 0 according to a distance function. The absolute log-ratio distance between
the Binomial likelihood function for any pair of arguments, k1 and k2, is
| ln pθ,n(k1)− ln pθ,n(k2)| =
∣∣∣∆n(k1, k2) + (k1 − k2) ln θ1−θ ∣∣∣
where ∆n(k1, k2) , ln
(
n
k1
) − ln ( nk2). By substituting this distance into the supremum of
Eq. (4), we seek feasible values of L > 0 for which the supremum is non-negative; here, we
explore the case where ρ((n, k1), (n, k2)) , |k1 − k2|. Without loss of generality, we assume
k1 > k2, and thus require that
sup
k1>k2
∣∣∣∆n(k1,k2)k1−k2 + ln θ1−θ ∣∣∣ ≤ L . (15)
However, by the definition of ∆n(k1, k2), the ratio
∆n(k1,k2)
k1−k2 is in fact the slope of the chord
from k2 to k1 on the function ln
(
n
k
)
. Since the function ln
(
n
k
)
is concave in k, this slope
achieves its maximum and minimum at its boundary values; i.e., it is maximised for k1 = 1
and k2 = 0 and minimised for k1 = n and k2 = n− 1. Thus, the ratio attains a maximum
value of lnn and a minimum of − lnn for which the above supremum is simply lnn+
∣∣∣ln θ1−θ ∣∣∣.
From Eq. (15), we therefore have, for all L ≥ lnn:
ΘL =
[(
1 + e
L
n
)−1
,
(
1 + n
eL
)−1]
.
We want to bound ξ(ΘL). We know that: ξ(ΘL) = 1 − ξ
(
Θ{L
)
where Θ{L is the
complement of ΘL. so ξ(Θ
{
L) is composed of two symmetric intervals:
[
0,
(
1 + e
L
n
)−1)
and((
1 + n
eL
)−1
, 1
]
. We selected α = β, therefore the mass must concentrate at 12 , as we have
α > 1.
Due to symmetry, the mass outside of ΘL is two times that is the first interval. This is:
2
B(α, α)
∫ p
1+p
0
xα−1(1− x)α−1 dx .
where p denotes ne−L ∈ [0, 1], Therefore c is upper bounded by
ln
(
2A(p)
B(α, α)
)
/(L0 − L) = ln
(
2A(p)
B(α, α)
)
/ ln p,
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where A(p) denotes the incomplete Beta function
∫ p
1+p
0 x
α−1(1 − x)α−1dx. Note that we
have
A′(p) =
pα−1
(1 + p)2α
,
A′′(p) =
pα−2[(α− 1)(1 + p)− 2αp]
(1 + p)2α+1
.
Claim 2 H(p) = αA(p)− pα
(1−p)(1+p)2α−1 ≤ 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof Calculating derivatives and simplifying
H ′(p)
= αA′(p)− αp
α−1(1− p)(1 + p)2α−1 − pα [(2α− 1)(1− p)(1 + p)2α−2 − (1 + p)2α−1]
[(1− p)(1 + p)2α−1]2
=
αpα−1
(1 + p)2α
− αp
α−1(1− p)(1 + p)− pα[(2α− 1)(1− p)− (1 + p)]
(1− p)2(1 + p)2α
=
pα−1
(1 + p)2α
(
α− α(1− p
2)− 2p(α− 1− pα)
(1− p)2
)
=
pα−1
(1 + p)2α(1− p)2
(
α(1− 2p+ p2)− α(1− p2) + 2p(α− 1− αp))
=
−2pα
(1 + p)2α(1− p)2 < 0 .
Therefore H(p) is strictly decreasing. Then combined with H(0) = 0, we claim follows.
Claim 3 G(p) = pA
′(p)
A(p) ln p− ln 2A(p)B(α,α) < 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof Again taking derivatives
G′(p) =
A′(p)
A(p)
(1 + ln p) + p ln p
A′′(p)A(p)−A′(p)2
A(p)2
− A
′(p)
A(p)
=
ln p
A(p)2
(A(p)A′(p) + pA′′(p)A(p)− pA′(p)2)
=
ln p
A(p)2
[
pα−1
(1 + p)2α
A(p)
(
1 +
(α− 1)(1 + p)− 2αp
1 + p
)
− p
2α−1
(1 + p)4α
]
=
ln p
A(p)2
pα−1
(1 + p)2α+1
[
α(1− p)A(p)− p
α
(1 + p)2α−1
]
=
pα−1
(p+ 1)2α+1A(p)2
H(p) ln p(1− p) > 0 .
So G(p) is strictly increasing. Combined with limp→1G(p) = 0, the claim follows.
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Claim 4 F (p) = ln
(
2I p
1+p
(α)
)
/ ln p is decreasing in p ∈ (0, 1), where the incomplete Beta
function I p
1+p
(α) = A(p)/B(α, α).
Proof Taking derivatives
F ′(p) =
1
ln2 p
(
A′(p)
A(p)
ln p− 1
p
ln
2A(p)
B(α, α)
)
=
1
p ln2 p
(
A′(p)
A(p)
p ln p− ln 2A(p)
B(α, α)
)
=
1
p ln2 p
G(p) < 0 .
Therefore ln
(
2I p
1+p
(α)
)
/ ln p is monotonic decreasing in p. Thus the minimum value of
F (p) is 1
B(α)22α−1 as p→ 1, which we can take as our c in this example.
Let us consider CFΘξ for this example. We have
pθ(x)
φ(x)
=
B(α, β)θx(1− θ)n−x
B(α+ x, n+ β − x) ,
where θ ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ [0, 1, . . . , n]. Note that
B(α+ x+ 1, n+ β − x− 1)
B(α+ x, n+ β − x) =
Γ (α+ x+ 1)Γ (n+ β − x− 1)
Γ (α+ x)Γ (n+ β + 1)
=
α+ x
n+ β − x− 1 .
So B(α+x+1, n+β−x−1) ≤ B(α+x, n+β−x) if x ≤ n+β−α−12 ; B(α+x+1, n+β−x−1) >
B(α+ x, n+ β − x) otherwise. Thus
B(α+ x, n+ β − x) ≥ B
(
n+ α+ β − 1
2
,
n+ α+ β + 1
2
)
.
Hence we can take CFΘξ = B(α, β)/B
(
n+α+β−1
2 ,
n+α+β+1
2
)
.
Proof of Lemma 22 Since N(x;µ, θ) is decreasing in x2 and concave as a function of
θ. We have φ(t) ≥ inf{x|||x||≤B},θ∈[c1,c2]N(x;µ, θ) = min
{√
c1
2pie
−c1c22
2 ,
√
c2
2pie
−c32
2
}
. Then we
can take
CFΘξ = min
{√
c2/c1e
c1c
2
2
2 , e
c32
2
}
For the normal distribution, (4) requires: 2Lρ(x, y)σ2 ≥ |2µ− x− y| |x− y|. Taking the
absolute log ratio of the Gaussian densities we have
1
2σ2
∣∣((x− µ)2 − (y − µ)2)∣∣
≤max { |µ|, 1 }
2σ2
(∣∣x2 − y2∣∣+ 2 |x− y|) .
33
Dimitrakakis, Nelson, Zhang, Mitrokotsa and Rubinstein
Consequently, we can set ρ(x, y) =
∣∣x2 − y2∣∣ + 2 |x− y| and L(µ, σ) = max{ |µ|,1 }
2σ2
. Again,
the trimmed exponential prior is given by Kλe−λθ, where K = (e−λc1 − e−λc2)−1. Thus the
CDF at L of this density is K
(
e−λc1 − e−λL) for L ∈ [ c1max{ |µ|,1 }2 , c2max{ |µ|,1 }2 ] and 1 for
L ≥ c2max{ |µ|,1 }2 . Thus the CDF at L of this density is K
(
e−λc1 − e −2λLmax{ |µ|,1 }
)
. We choose
L0 to be
c1max{ |µ|,1 }
2 . Then we need to find c such that
ξ(ΘL) =
∫ L
c1
Kλe−λθdθ = K(e−λc1 − e−λL) ≥ 1− e−c
(
L− c1 max{ |µ|,1 }
2
)
.
By plugging K into the inequality, we have
e
−c
(
L− c1 max{ |µ|,1 }
2
)
≥ e
−2λL
max{ |µ|,1 }+λc2 − 1
e−λ(c1−c2) − 1 .
Since e
−λ
(
2λL
max{ |µ|,1 }−c2
)
≤ e−λ(c1−c2), it is sufficiency to find c such that
e
−c
(
L− c1 max{ |µ|,1 }
2
)
≥ e−λ
(
2L
max{ |µ|,1 }−c1
)
.
This is equivalent to have c satisfying
c
(
L− c1 max { |µ|, 1 }
2
)
≤ λ
(
2L
max { |µ|, 1 } − c1
)
.
Then we can take c = 2λmax{ |µ|,1 } to satisfy the above inequality.
Proof of Lemma 23 Consider the likelihood log-ratio distance of multivariate normal
distributions with precision matrix A:
1
2
|x>Ax− y>Ay| ,
where A is positive definite with eigenvalues λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λn > 0). For simplicity, assume the
mean to be a zero vector then
|x>Ax− y>Ay| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j
xixjAi,j −
∑
i,j
yiyjAi,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j
Ai,j(xixj − yiyj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= |Tr(A(xx> − yy>)′)|
≤ [Tr(A2)Tr((xx> − yy>)(xx> − yy>)′)] 12
=
(
n∑
i=1
λ2i
) 1
2
||(xx> − yy>)||F .
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For mean equal to µ, we have
1
2
|(x> − µ)A(x− µ)− (y> − µ)A(y − µ)| .
By the above analysis we have the difference being bounded by
1
2
(
n∑
i=1
λ2i
) 1
2
||(x− µ)(x− µ)′ − (y − µ)(y − µ)′)||F .
Note that
||(x− µ)(x− µ)′ − (y − µ)(y − µ)′)||F =||xx> − µ(x> − y>)− (x− y)µ′ − yy>||F
≤||xx> − yy>||F + 2||µ(x− y)′||F
=||xx> − yy>||F + 2||µ||2||(x− y)′||2
≤max{1, ||µ||2}(||xx> − yy>||F + 2||x− y||2) .
Proof of Lemma 24 It is instructive to first examine the case where all variables are
independent and we have a single draw from Pθ. Then Pθ(x) =
∏K
k=1 θk,xk and∣∣∣∣ln Pθ(x)Pθ(y)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ln
K∏
k=1
θk,xk
θk,yk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣ln θk,xkθk,yk
∣∣∣∣ I {xk 6= yk} ≤ maxi,j,k
∣∣∣∣ln θk,iθk,j
∣∣∣∣ ρ(x, y) . (16)
Consequently, if ε , mink,j θk.j is the smallest probability assigned to any one sub-event,
then L > ln 1/ε, since θk,j ≤ 1.
In the general case, we have independent draws xt, yt, where xt ∼ Pθ(x) and the variables
xtk have dependences defined through a graphical model, such that Pθ(x) =
∏
k Pθ(xk |
xP(k)), where P(k) are the parents of node k. Similarly to (16), we write∣∣∣∣ln Pθ(x)Pθ(y)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ln∏
t
Pθ(x
t)
Pθ(yt)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ln∏
t
∏
k
Pθ(x
t
k | xtP(k))
Pθ(y
t
k | ytP(k))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
t.k
∣∣∣∣∣ln Pθ(x
t
k | xtP(k))
Pθ(y
t
k | ytP(k))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ln 1∑
t.k
I
{
xtk 6= ytk ∨ xtP(k) 6= ytP(k)
}
. (17)
The last term is the number of times a value is different in x and y times one plus the
number of variables it affects. To model this, let v ∈ NK be such that vk = 1 + deg(k) and
define: ρ(x, y) , v>δ(x, y) and δk(x, y) ,
∑
t I {xk,t 6= yk,t}. Rewriting (17) in terms of ρ,
we obtain
∣∣∣ln Pθ(x)Pθ(y) ∣∣∣ ≤ ln 1ε · ρ(x, y) as desired.
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